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Non-Technical Summary
According to the Schumpeterian view, intellectual property (IP) protection policy and antitrust
policy might affect firms’ incentives to innovate in opposite directions. The former policy gives
monopoly rights to innovators, thus, increasing incremental profits from innovation. The latter policy
suppresses firms’ market power decreasing incremental profits from innovation. This article con-
tributes to understanding the interaction of IP protection policy and antitrust policy for stimulating
firms’ innovation. It takes into account that firms’ innovation strategies can differ. Concretely, firms
can choose whether to engage into imitative innovation improving already existing products or more
radical innovation introducing market novelties.
Using a sample of 1253 German firms from manufacturing and services sectors. I analyze the im-
pact of both the effectiveness of IP protection and competitive pressure on firms’ innovation strategy
choices. Three innovation strategies are considered: to abstain from innovation, to introduce products
that are known in the market but new to the firm (imitation) or to introduce market novelties (inno-
vation). I find that the effectiveness of patent protection perceived by firms positively affects firms’
innovativeness, i.e. propensity of imitation and innovation. Having a small and a medium number of
competitors also positively affects firms’ innovativeness. However, this effect depends on the perceived
effectiveness of patent protection. If the perceived effectiveness of patent protection is low or medium,
both innovation and imitation are enhanced, whereas if it is high, only innovation is enhanced.
The results suggest that the two policies, IP protection policy and antitrust policy, can reinforce
each other in promoting innovation. For instance, in markets with few competitors an increase in
patent protection effectiveness perceived by firms might rather increase firms’ incentives to introduce
market novelties. By contrast, in markets where firms have almost monopoly power an increase in
patent protection effectiveness might rather promote the introduction of improved products. Despite
the common patent system in all industries the perceived effectiveness of IP protection by firms can
be affected, for instance, through the courts’ interpretation of novelty and non-obviousness.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Patenschutz und Wettbewerbspolitik ko¨nnen sich auf unterschiedliche Weise auf unternehmerische
Anreize zu innovieren auswirken. Patentschutz sta¨rkt die Marktmacht von Innovatoren, wa¨hrend
Wettbewerbspolitik diese schwa¨cht. Dieser Artikel zeigt, wie Patentschutz und Wettbewerbspolitik
das Innovationsverhalten von Unternehmen beeinflussen ko¨nnen und wie sie dabei interagieren.
Anhand einer Stichprobe von 1253 deutschen Unternehmen aus Industrie- und Dienstleistungssek-
toren wird der Einfluss von Patentschutz und Wettbewerbspolitik auf die Innovationsstrategien der
Unternehmen untersucht. Dabei werden drei Innovationsstrategien betrachtet: der Verzicht auf Inno-
vationen, die Einfu¨hrung von Produkten, die am Markt bekannt, aber fu¨r das Unternehmen neu sind
(Imitation) und die Einfu¨hrung von Marktneuheiten (Innovation).
Es zeigt sich, dass sich die von den Unternehmen wahrgenommene Wirksamkeit des Patentschutzes
positiv auf die Innovationskraft, d.h. auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu imitieren oder zu innovieren
auswirkt. Eine kleine oder mittlere Anzahl von Wettbewerbern kann sich ebenfalls positiv auf die In-
novationsaktivita¨t der Unternehmen auswirken. Dieser Effekt ha¨ngt jedoch wiederum von der von den
Unternehmen wahrgenommenen Effektivita¨t des Patentschutzes ab. Bei einer niedrigen bis mittleren
Effektivita¨t des Patentschutzes werden Imitation und Innovation begu¨nstigt. Eine hohe Effektivita¨t
des Patentschutzes hingegen begu¨nstigt nur Innovationen.
Diese Erkenntnisse zeigen, dass sich der Schutz des intellektuellen Eigentums und die Wettbe-
werbspolitik bei der Begu¨nstigung von Innovationen gegenseitig versta¨rken ko¨nnen. Zum Beispiel
kann in Ma¨rkten mit wenigen Wettbewerbern eine Erho¨hung der Patentschutz-Effektivita¨t die un-
ternehmerischen Anreize erho¨hen Marktneuheiten einzufu¨hren. In Ma¨rkten, in denen Firmen fast eine
Monopolstellung haben, kann ein Anstieg der Patentschutz-Effektivita¨t die Einfu¨hrung verbesserter
Produkte fo¨rdern. Trotz des gemeinsamen Patentschutzsystems in allen Branchen, kann die von den
Unternehmen wahrgenommene Effektivita¨t des Patentschutzes zum Beispiel durch gerichtliche Inter-
pretation von Neuheit oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit variieren.
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Abstract
This article analyzes how the perceived effectiveness of intellectual property protection and
competitive pressure affect firms’ innovation strategy choices, concretely, whether to abstain from
innovation, to introduce products that are known in the market but new to the firm (imitation) or to
introduce market novelties (innovation). Using a sample of 1253 German firms from manufacturing
and services sectors I show that the perceived effectiveness of patent protection positively affects
firms’ propensity to imitate and to innovate. Having a small or a medium number of competitors
positively affects firms’ propensity to imitate and to innovate as compared to being a monopolist
or having a large number of competitors. However, this effect varies with the perceived patent
protection effectiveness. If the perceived patent protection effectiveness is low or medium, both
innovation and imitation are enhanced, whereas if it is high, only innovation is enhanced.
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1 Introduction
In the recent economic literature the impact of market structure on firms’ innovativeness has received
much attention. In particular, there are two major debates regarding the impact of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) protection and competitive pressure. The first debate discusses the impact of IP protection
on firm innovative performance. In line with it, two confronting views are present. According to the
first view, IP protection is a necessary mechanism that provides incentives for firms to engage in R&D
and encourages a technology transfer between firms. Therefore, the strong protection of intellectual
property rights, for instance, broad and long patents, would be the optimal R&D policy (Arora and
Gambardella, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2003; Gans et al., 2008; Boldrin and Levine, 2008). However,
this view has recently been challenged by Aghion et al. (2001), Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Zhou
(2009), who show that a higher level of spillovers can induce imitation and, thus, foster innovative
efforts by incumbent firms. Therefore, the patent protection can block the future development of
technologies. The second debate concerns the effect of a competitive pressure on the firm innovation.
Some studies suggest a monotonic relationship between the competitive pressure and firm R&D ex-
penditures, positive (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Geroski, 1990; Blundell et al., 1999; Correa, 2012)
or negative (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Zhou, 2009) , whereas others propose a non-monotonic
inverted U-shaped (Aghion et al., 2005) or U–shaped relationship (Tishler and Milstein, 2009).
One of possible reasons for such contradictory findings is that most of the above mentioned studies
assume that firms’ innovation strategies are homogeneous meaning that all firms invest in R&D and
innovate symmetrically. However, empirical evidence suggests that most markets are characterized by
heterogeneous innovation activities within as well as across markets. This heterogeneity arises as the
result of firms’ decisions to engage in R&D or to abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes
of innovators. Furthermore, policy interventions, such as competition policy or intellectual property
protection, might affect firms’ innovation strategies and, consequently, the outcomes of firm innova-
tion. A theoretical study by Aghion et al (2001) suggests the existence of a potential complementarity
between competition (antitrust) policy and patent policy. It shows that, in the presence of imitation,
an increase in competition is always positive for innovation incentives of firms. At the same time, for
any given level of competition a little imitation is innovation-enhancing, whereas too much imitation
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discourages innovation incentives. However, this study assumes exogenously innovating and imitating
firms, although in reality firms can switch from imitative to innovative strategy choosing the poten-
tially most profitable strategy. Therefore, potential complementarities in the effect of both factors,
intellectual property protection effectiveness and competitive pressure, on firm innovation strategies
choice should be analyzed.
The present study is novel in two ways. First, it empirically analyzes firms’ innovation strategy
choices. The dependent variable represents a firm’s innovation strategy choice among the following
alternatives: to abstain from innovation, to introduce improved products (imitation) and to introduce
market novelties (innovation). Therefore, a discrete choice model (stereotype logit) is employed.
Second, it includes explanatory variables that were not considered together in previous studies. These
are internal firm characteristics (firm size, human capital quality, capital and export intensity and
the geographical scope of the market) and external factors, concretely, the perceived effectiveness
of IP protection by patents and trademarks, competitive pressure measured by the number of main
competitors and relative profit differences. The effectiveness of legal mechanisms for IP protection is
measured as the scores of the success of legal protection mechanisms for innovations and inventions
(patents and trademarks) reported by firms and averaged at an industry level.
The results suggest that firms’ innovation strategy choices are tightly related to internal firm char-
acteristics and external market factors. A larger firm size and more skilled human capital are positively
associated with a firm’s propensity to improve existing products (imitation) and to introduce market
novelties (innovation), although the latter effect is higher in magnitude than the former. Geographical
market size, namely, having access to European and worldwide markets is strongly positively associ-
ated to a firm’s propensity to imitation and innovation. Regarding external factors, the results suggest
that the perceived effectiveness of patent protection positively affects innovation and imitation for any
level of competition. Its positive impact on innovation has a U-inverted shape decreasing when the
number of competitors is high. The number of competitors has a U-inverted relationship with firms’
propensities for imitation and innovation. Specifically, an increase in competitive pressure from 0 to
few competitors (from 1 to 5 and from 6 to 15) and a decrease in competitive pressure from many
(more than 15) to few competitors positively affect the propensity of firms to improve already existing
products and to introduce market novelties. This effect varies with the perceived patent protection
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effectiveness. If the perceived patent protection effectiveness is low or medium, both innovation and
imitation are enhanced, whereas if it is high, only innovation is enhanced. The indicator of relative
profit differences suggests that a decrease in competitive pressure negatively affects both imitation
and innovation. This effect weakly decreases for imitation and becomes insignificant for innovation
when IP protection effectiveness perceived by firms increases.
The findings of this study suggest to look beyond overall R&D expenditures in the analysis of inno-
vative performance in the markets because firms might choose different innovation strategies, and their
choices in turn affect overall innovative performance in industries. Additionally, the present analysis
derives a link between IP protection policy and competition policy. The two policies are usually con-
sidered to be substitutes because the former gives to a firm the market power over intellectual property
whereas the latter is aimed at reducing the market power. However, these two policies can reinforce
each other in promoting innovation. For instance, in markets with few competitors better patent
protection might positively affect firms’ incentives to introduce market novelties. On the contrary,
in markets where firms have almost monopoly power an increase in patent protection can promote
an introduction of improved products, i.e. incremental innovation, rather than the introduction of
market novelties, i.e. radical innovation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a relevant discussion in the
literature. Section 3 describes the data for the empirical analysis and derives hypotheses to be tested.
The econometric methodology is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally,
Section 6 derives some policy implications and concludes.
2 Background discussion
This article is related to a large literature on the relationship between market structure and innovation
strategy. Since it focuses on the effect of competitive pressure and intellectual property protection on
firms’ innovation strategies, it is related to two strands. The first strand analyzes how firms’ R&D
investments are affected by market competition. Pioneer works in this field are those of Schumpeter
(1934 and 1942) who argues that, on the one hand, market pressure may foster firms’ innovation,
but, on the other hand, it may decrease firms’ R&D investments because monopoly power of larger
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firms acts as a major accelerator of technological progress. Actually, there is still no accordance on the
Schumpeterian debate in theoretical and empirical studies. For example, some authors argue that more
intensive market competition decreases firms’ incentives for innovation because when advantages from
innovation are temporary, only sufficient market power guarantees that firms invest in R&D (Arrow,
1962; Futia, 1980; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; or Zhou, 2009). This argument is
supported by empirical studies, which find that market concentration increases the pace of innovative
change. For instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show that large firms in the US pharmaceutical
industry perform R&D more efficiently, as they can enjoy scale and scope economies. On the other
hand, market concentration is also argued to have a dampening effect on innovation because more
intensive competition acts as an important incentive for firms to innovate (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980).
Again, these theoretical arguments are supported by empirical evidence (Geroski, 1990; Blundell et
al., 1999).
These contradictory results led to the hypothesis that the effect of market competition on firms’
innovative efforts is non-monotonic. For example, Boone (2000) finds that when competition is weak,
the incentives to innovate increase for less efficient firms. When competition becomes more intense,
however, the incentives to innovate increase for more efficient firms. Aghion et al. (2005) suggest the
existence of an inverted-U relationship. Both, a low or high level of competition provide low incentives
to innovate whereas a medium level of competition fosters innovation of firms operating on a similar
technological level (“neck-and-neck firms”). Recently, this finding was challenged by Correa (2012)
who finds a structral break in the data and, after controlling for that, a positive effect of competition
on innovation. On the contrary, Tishler and Milstein (2009) find that R&D investments decrease with
competitive pressure. However, at a certain level of competition firms engage in ”R&D wars” and
spend excessively on R&D.
The above mentioned literature assumes that firms’ innovation behavior is homogeneous, that
is, that all firms innovate by spending on R&D. However, empirical evidence suggests that firms’
innovative activity is heterogeneous within markets. For instance, using data of Italian firms, Cefis
and Orsenigo (2001) and Cefis (2003) find that in most markets there is a core of firms that are
persistent innovators while other firms innovate only occasionallly. Czarnitzki et al. (2008) find
that, depending on a firm’s role in the market, competitive pressure might have a different effect on
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innovative effort. So, whereas entry pressure decreases the average investment per firm, it increases
innovative effort of market leaders. Vives (2008) analyzes the effect of the number of competitors
on process introduction aimed at reducing production costs and product innovation aimed at new
product introduction. For process innovation, an increase in the number of competitors decreases
cost-reduction expenditures, whereas the results are ambiguous for product innovation.
The second strand of the literature, to which the present article is related, distinguishes between
firms that innovate or imitate the outcomes of innovators’ activity. Theoretical studies have analyzed
the impact of ease of imitation (or the extent of spillovers) on innovative incentives in two frameworks,
economic growth models (Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992) and oligopolistic
competition models (Zhou, 2009). In some studies, imitation is shown to foster the innovation activity
of technological leaders. In fact, strong IP protection may slow down the technological development
and decrease the welfare and consumer surplus (Helpman, 1993; Bessen & Maskin 2009; Che et al.,
2009; Fershtman & Markovich, 2010). In other studies, IP protection is shown to be a necessary
mechanism that provides incentives for firms to engage in R&D and encourages technology transfer
between firms. Therefore, Gans and Stern (2003), Gans et al. (2008), Boldrin and Levine (2008)
suggest strong protection of intellectual property rights as the optimal R&D policy. Additionally,
Braguinsky et al. (2007) show that the relationship between innovation and imitation might depend
on other factors such as the maturity of an industry. When the industry is young and small, innovators
have no incentives to prevent imitation. But when the industry expands, innovative effort decreases
because of imitation pressure, therefore, innovators benefit from intellectual protection mechanisms.
Most of this literature assumes that innovators and imitators are exogenously determined. Excep-
tions in the theoretical literature are Segestrom (1991), Takalo (1998) and Amir and Wooders (2000).
Applying an economic growth model, Segestrom (1991) allows firms to participate in both innovative
and imitative R&D races. In the steady-state, firms’ equilibrium innovation strategies depend on the
distribution of previous R&D outcomes and the relative price of imitation. Firms are found to benefit
more from imitation in industries with a single leader, whereas in industries with several leaders in-
novation is a more profitable strategy. In a standard oligopoly framework, Amir and Wooders (2000)
show that, in equilibrium, firms choose their innovation strategies asymmetrically. This gives rise
to a market with one innovating and one imitating firm. Finally, Takalo (1998) shows that under
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endogenous imitations short patents are optimal.
Regarding the empirical literature, until now few attention has been paid to the impact of com-
petitive pressure and intellectual property protection due to poor data availability. Link and Neufeld
(1986) examine the effect of market competition on the firms’ choices to innovate or to imitate. Using
cross-sectional data they analyze firms’ strategy choice as a function of firm size, market share, and
industry concentration. The present article is similar to their study in that it explores how market
competition affects firms’ choice between innovation and imitation. However, it extends competition
measures considering various indicators such as the number of competitors and relative profit differ-
ences and takes into account IP protection effectiveness perceived by firms, which is important for
firms’ incentives for product innovation. Moreover, this article explores how competition measures
affect firms’ innovation strategy choices given different levels of IP protection effectiveness in the
industry.
Despite the extensive existing research on firm innovativeness, empirical studies have following
drawbacks. During the last decades they discussed the determinants of R&D activity mainly based
on internal firm characteristics such as firm size, appropriability of the outcomes of innovation, access
to international markets, cooperation with customers, suppliers and others (Patel and Pavitt, 1992;
Cre´pon et al., 1998; Loof and Heshmati, 2002; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). Less attention has
been paid to external factors because their measurement raises certain problems. For example, the
intensity of market competition has been proxied with concentration measures, such as concentration
ratios or Herfindahl-Hirshman index, based on industry level data (Geroski, 1990; Blundel et al.,
1999; Aghion et al., 2005). The problem with this approach is that the product market, in which
firms compete, can hardly be identified by an industrial sector. So, firms within one sector might not
compete at all if their products meet different consumer needs. Another problem is the measurement
of spillovers. The average spillover level has been measured with industry data as an average of firm
R&D expenditures in the industry (Bloom et al., 2007; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2007). However, firms
can protect the outcomes of their R&D activity by using legal protection mechanisms as well as by
secrecy. So, this indicator might wrongly reflect the spillover level in the industry or in the market. The
common problem with the measurement of these variables is that market characteristics such as the
firm’s market position or the level of knowledge protection are not directly observable. The Mannheim
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Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey used in this study, allows to take an alternative approach to the
measurement of external market factors. In this survey, firms provide information about these factors
according to their own perceptions of market characteristics, such as the number of main competitors
and the effectiveness of legal mechanisms for intellectual property protection. These perceptions are
tightly related to their innovation strategy choices.
3 Data and hypotheses
To investigate the determinants of firms’ innovation strategy choices, the data from the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP) are used.1 This survey is conducted by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) as part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for Germany on a yearly basis.
It covers a sample of German firms in manufacturing and service sectors during the period 1995-2012.
The data includes information regarding the introduction of new products, services and innovation
processes within firms. The database has a cross-sectional structure such that survey questions differ
across waves. Only the 2005 innovation survey, which is the 13th wave of the MIP, provides the
necessary data for the purposes of this study. In this survey, firms were asked about both internal and
external factors that affect their commercialization and innovation decisions during the period 2002-
2004. Enterprises with 5 or more employees are covered. The drawing probabilities are disproportional
with higher drawing quotas applied for large enterprises, enterprises from Eastern Germany and from
sectors with a high variation in labour productivity. Whereas the independent variables are drawn
from the 2005 survey, the dependent variable is drawn from the 2007 survey to decrease a potential
simultaneity bias.
The dependent variable of the analysis represents a firm’s innovation strategy choice. It is a
categorical variable that indicates if, between 2004 and 2006, a firm did not conduct innovations (the
value 0), introduced a product that is new for the firm but known in the market (the value 1) or
introduced a product that is new for the market (the value 2). The questions in the survey that
allow to distinguish between innovators and imitators refer only to product innovations, therefore,
implications derived in the present study are applied, mainly, to product innovation. This dependent
variable can also be interpreted as the degree of innovation. Then, the value 1 refers to an incremental
1This data are provided by ZEW Research Data Centre, http://kooperationen.zew.de/en/zew-fdz/home.html.
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innovation (an improvement of already existing products) and the value 2 refers to a radical innovation
(an introduction of a new product, which did not exist in the market before). In addition, firms that
haven’t introduce any new products because they aborted or did not complete innovation during the
period of observation are excluded from the sample. This allows to exclude from consideration those
factors that impede innovation success despite a firm’s willingness to innovate.
As it is common in the economic literature, we interpret the introduction of a product that is
new for the market as innovation whereas the introduction of a product that is new for the firm (but
not for the market) as imitation. This interpretation is supported by Link and Neufeld (1986), who
surveyed 76 R&D active US manufacturing companies. The vice presidents were asked whether their
firm’s overall R&D strategy was innovative or imitative and whether this classification is meaningful.
All of them reported that although their firms operated in several lines of business, one dominant
strategy characterized the overall R&D effort. However, the dependent variable of their analysis has
an important drawback. It is based on the subjective vision of vice presidents of the companies
and has a retrospective nature. Therefore, in the regression analysis with contemporaneous market
characteristics the problem of endogeneity arises. On the contrary, the dependent variable of the
present article allows to identify the outcome of the strategy chosen by a firm. The independent
variables are drawn from the earlier survey. This allows to decrease the direct endogeneity due to the
simultaneity in observations.
The sample of 1253 German firms used for this study shows that the rate of innovating and
imitating firms varies across industries. The total number of non-innovating, imitating and innovating
firms for manufacturing and services sectors in the year 2007 is, correspondingly, 631 (53%), 313 (26%)
and 238 (20%). The highest rate of non-innovating firms can be observed in manufacturing sectors
including mining (81%), wood / paper (75%), glass / ceramics (73%), metals (77%), and many services
sectors. On the other hand, most firms are innovators in sectors such as chemicals (31%), medical
instruments (40%) and electrical (40%) and transport equipment (42%).
To study firms’ innovation strategy choices, the two categories of independent variables are included
into the empirical model: variables that measure internal and external factors. As commonly used in
firm-level studies, our internal factors are: firm size (lsize), the quality of human capital (hc), capital
intensity (capint), export intensity (expint), a dummy for firms’ membership in a group of companies
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(group), the geographical size of the market, to which a firm has access (geo), and, specific to our
data, firm location in the territory of former Eastern Germany (east).
Most studies on firm innovation control for firm size because larger firms are supposed to more
efficiently conduct innovation due to economies of scale and scope (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996;
Shefer and Frenkel, 2005). In the present study lsize measures the log-number of employees to control
for non-linearities in the effect of firm size on the firms’ innovation strategy choices. Regarding the
group dummy, previous studies suggest that firms, which belong to a group, have more incentives and
resources for innovation. geo is used as a proxy for a firm’s market size. We create 4 dummies to
distinguish between geographical scope of markets that firms have access to: local or regional markets,
the German (i.e. nation-wide) market, the market of EU, EU candidates and EFTA member countries
and the world market. Following previous studies, a positive effect of geo on a firm’s propensity to
engage in R&D is expected.
Apart from the traditional internal factors mentioned above, the literature stresses the importance
of the so called ”absorptive capacity” for firms’ innovation activity. According to Cohen and Levinthal
(1989), this term stands for a firm’s ability to identify, assimilate and apply new knowledge given
the firm’s experience, human capital skills, and organizational procedures’ flexibility and relevance.
Firms that have more advanced human capital skills are expected to dispose of more capability for
R&D. There is a number of ways to measure a firm’s human capital quality. Given the cross-sectional
structure of our data, hc is measured as a firm’s proportion of employees with at least university degree.
As firms’ performance depends on the employees skills, the general level of education, experience and
training of employees, this seems to be a good proxy for a firm’s human capital quality and is expected
to positively affect firms’ innovativeness. A more sophisticated approach (see Vega-Jurado et al, 2008)
extends the notion of absorptive capacity to technological opportunity, appropriability conditions and
internal technological competences that affect firms’ innovation strategies. Finally, I use the dummy
variable east to control whether a firm is located in former Eastern Germany. Historically, firms that
belong to the western and the eastern part of Germany were affected by different policies (subsidies,
taxes, institutions). As a consequence, there might exist a systematic difference in the innovative
performance of firms located in these regions.
Regarding the external factors, the variables used are the perceived effectiveness of intellectual
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property rights protection by patents (pat) and trademarks (tm), and competitive pressure, measured
by the number of main competitors (com) and relative profit differences (rpd). The effectiveness of
legal mechanisms for IP protection, pat and tm, is measured as the success scores of legal protection
mechanisms for innovations and inventions, patents and trademarks, reported by firms. In order to
obtain the information on the effecttiveness of legal protection mechanisms, each firm was asked to
evaluate to what extent patents and trademarks protect intellectual property. Firms’ evaluations are
represented in the form of a Likert scale ranging from 0 (”not at all”) to 3 (”highly”). To deal with the
possible endogeneity of these indexes, following Schmidt (2006), for each firm I calculate the average
index value across the NACE 3-digit industry code excluding the firm in observation. A higher value
of this index for each IP protection mechanism means that this mechanism achieves better intellectual
property protection in the firm’s market. A priori, patents and trademarks effectiveness in the industry
are expected to positively affect firms’ incentives to imitate and to innovate. Nevertheless, the effect
on imitation might be smaller and would be rather indirect by encouraging innovation.
The categorical variable com measures the number of main competitors reported by a firm: 0
competitors, from 1 to 5, from 6 to 15 or more than 15. Since a firm has a better vision of its
own market structure, this indicator measures closer the intensity of market competition. For the
estimation 4 dummies are created (comi, i = 0, ..., 3) , where i = 0 indicates that a firm has no
competitors, i = 1 from 1 to 5 competitors, i = 2 from 6 to 15 competitors, and i = 3 more than 15
competitors. Because theoretical and empirical results in the literature are ambiguous, I don’t have
any expectations regarding the effect of the number of competitors on firms’ innovativeness.
Finally, I consider an additional measure of competitive pressure, relative profit differences (rpd).
It was originally proposed by Boone (2008) and defined as follows. For every three firms with different
efficiency levels n′′ > n′ > n the index [(pi (n′′)− pi (n))] / [pi (n′)− pi (n)] raises when the competitive
pressure becomes more intense, where pi(n) is the profit of a firm with the efficiency level n. This
measure is robust to the theoretical specification and is convenient for the empirical analysis due
to its computational simplicity and data requirements. Specifically, it is sufficient to use only the
sample of firms in the industry such that the key property of this index holds. It is important that
firms interact in the markets with relatively homogenous goods and that firms are symmetric so that
equally efficient firms get equal profits. The measure of rpd, which is applied in the present empirical
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analysis, is modified, following Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2011). Firms in the industry (at
NACE 4-digit level) are ordered according to their normalized efficiency (n− n) / (n− n), where n
and n are the efficiencies of the least and the most efficient firm in the industry, correspondingly. The
efficiency level is approximated by average variable cost defined by the sum of material and labour
cost normalized by firms’ turnover, as proposed by Boone (2008). In order to avoid dividing by zero
for the case n = n the inverse of the original rpd index is used and firms’ profits are normalized by
turnover. Therefore, the applied index rpd is given by:
rpd (n) =
pi (n) /sales (n)− pi (n) /sales (n)
pi (n) /sales (n)− pi (n) /sales (n)
A higher level of rpd index is associated to a lower level of competition experienced by a firm in an
industry.
Regarding industry dummies, following OECD taxonomy for NACE Rev.1 codes, I include dum-
mies for 25 aggregated industry sectors. This allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity in inno-
vative performance across sectors. The industry effects on firms’ innovation strategy choice might be
twofold. On the one hand, industry dummies might capture the technological complexity of knowledge
in the industry. The fact that the technology is more advanced in the industry can impede introduc-
tion of improved and new products. On the other hand, industry dummies might indicate the level
of spillovers from rivals’ innovation in the industry. Thus, in industries with high rate of innovation
firms can be more disposed to conduct innovation resulting in the introduction of improved and new
products. In addition, the interaction terms of pat and industry dummies are included to control for
different impact of the effectiveness of patent protection in the specific industry. The effectiveness of
patents might depend on the underlying knowledge base, i.e. on the extent to which the new ideas
and knowledge can be codified in terms of universal categories for a given industry. If this is the case,
the object and scope of patent can be defined with more precision.
In the sample of 1253 German firms over 24% of firms introduced product innovations that were
new to their market by 2005, whereas 29% of firms introduced products that were already known to
their market but new for the firm. 47% of firms abstained from innovation. Table 1 presents the
descriptive statistics.The average firm in the sample has 453 employees, among which, on average 20%
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of employees have at least higher education. 31% of firms are group members, and 34% of the firms are
from Eastern Germany. The similar shares of firms have access to markets of different geographical
sizes: 29% to local or regional markets in Germany, 29% to German national market, 17% to European
and 25% to the worldwide market. 25% of firms reported that they have more than 15 competitors
in their markets. Similarly, 23% of firms reported to have 1-5 main competitors, whereas only 9%
are monopolists in their markets. Most of firms (43%) have claimed to have 6-15 competitors. The
average perceived effectiveness of patent protection (0.53) is higher on average than the perceived
effectiveness of protection by trademarks (0.44). A detailed description of the variables is provided in
Table 3.
4 Empirical model
The statistical model that analyzes firms’ innovation strategy choices as a function of firm charac-
teristics and external market parameters should take into account that firms’ innovation strategy
choices can be threefold: no innovation, imitation and innovation. Given a set of regressors xij , where
i = 1, ..., I indexes firms and j = 1, ..., J indexes regressors, the combination of variables
∑J
j=0 (xijβj)
is used to distinguish between the K categories of the outcome variable. Due to the nature of the de-
pendent variable, a discrete choice model should be employed and the choice of the model is determined
by the relationship between the categories of the dependent variable.
Recall that the introduction of products new to the firm is defined as an imitation or an incre-
mental innovation, whereas an introduction of products new to the market is defined as a radical
innovation. The previous studies (Link & Neufeld, 1986; Vinding, 2006) suggest that the choice of
a firm’s innovation strategy, an imitation or an innovation, depends on the amount of resources that
it is willing to spend on R&D and on the expected profitability of each strategy. Concretely, the
amount of resources that is needed to improve already existing products is smaller than the amount of
resources needed for the maintenance of an R&D laboratory and a radical innovation. Therefore, the
choice categories reflect the degree of firms’ involvement into an innovation activity. Vinding (2006)
suggests the existence of a natural ordering of the dependent variable categories according to the
degree of firms’ ”innovativeness” and proposes an econometric specification based on an ordered logit.
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This model is based on two important assumptions. First, it assumes that the same combination of
independent variables can be used to distinguish between all levels of the outcome variable. Second,
the odds ratio for being in a category k or higher, relative to being in a category k − 1 or lower, is
assumed to be the same for all k, 2 ≤ k ≤ K. This assumption is also known as the parallel regression
assumption. In the context of our analysis this means that the effect of regressors on the decision to
imitate instead of not to innovate is the same as on the decision to innovate instead of to imitate.
Since this assumption is not fulfilled, the ordered logit is not applied for the present analysis2.
Another potentially applicable model for categorical dependent variables is a multinomial logit. It
relies on the assumption that the choices between categories are independent on the set of available
alternatives. This assumption is known as IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) and it states
that the relative probability of choosing one category instead of another does not depend on the set
of other available (”irrelevant”) alternatives. For instance, the relative probability of engaging in
imitation or innovation does not change in the absence of the alternative ”not to innovate”. This
approach is used by Vega-Jurado et al (2008) who use the same dependent variable as the present
article. Traditionally, application of the multinomial logit model is contrasted by Hausman and Small-
Hsiao tests for the IIA assumption. The results of these tests are often contradictory. Therefore,
the general advice when using the multinomial logit model is to rely on underlying meaning of the
categories of the dependent variable. Despite the fact that in the analysis some tests show an evidence
supporting IIA when using the multinomial logit model, the present study adopts a more appropriate
econometric specification. It allows to estimate the parameters for each of the alternatives and then
to test the existence of ordering nature in the dependent variable.
A compromise between the two models described above, a multinomial and an ordered logit, is a
stereotype logistic regression proposed by Anderson (1984). This model imposes ordering constraints
on the multinomial model. In the multinomial logistic model K−1 parameters β˜k, k = 1, ...,K−1 are
estimated. The stereotype logistic model imposes restriction on the multinomial model by estimatingD
parameter vectors, where 1 < D < min (K − 1, j). The relationship between coefficients of stereotype
model βd, d = 1, ..., D and the multinomial model’s coefficients is β˜k =
∑D
d=1 φdkβd. The parameters
2For the dataset the LR-test for the pallel regression assumption (Wolfe and Gould, 1998) and a Wald test (Brant,
1990) are performed. Both tests reject the parallel regression assumption at 0.01 level.
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φdk are estimated together with parameters βd. Denote ηk = θk+
∑D
d=1 φdkxβd
3, where x is a row
vector of covariates and θk are unrestricted constant terms for each equation. The probability of
observing outcome k is:















Using the data of 1253 German firms from manufacturing and services sectors the one-dimensional
stereotype logistic model (d = 1) is specified as:
ηk = θk + φk
 β1lsize+ β2hc+ β3capint+ β3 exp int+ β4group+∑3i=0 β5igeoi + β6east
+β7pat+ β8tm+
∑3
i=0 β9icomi + β10rpd03 + indust.dummies+ inter.terms
 .
In this model, the estimated relationship between rescaling parameters φk indicates the appropri-
ability of the categories ordering. If φ1 ≤ φ2 ≤ ... ≤ φK holds, the nature of the dependent variable
is indeed ordered. For model identification, we must impose the following restrictions on θk and φk:
θ0 = φ0 = 0 and φ1 = 1. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered within NACE 3-digit industries)
are computed for stereotype logistic regression. The algorithm assumes an independence of the error
terms over clusters and a correlation of the error terms within clusters. As mentioned above, the
stereotype logistic model has a number of advantages as compared to previously used models. First,
it relaxes the proportional regression assumption of an ordered logit. Second, it does not impose an
ordering restriction on categories, but rather allows to test the appropriability of ordering. Third,
it relies on maximum likelihood estimation of different coefficients for each alternative (multinomial
logistic model) and, then, reparameterizes the coefficients. Therefore, it highlights the ordering of
categories and reduces the number of parameters for interpretation, without reducing significantly the
appropriability of the fit.
3Originally, Andreson (1984) introduced the model as ηk = θk−
∑D
d=1 φdkxβd. The minus sign in front of φs makes
the interpretation confusing, therefore here the model is rewritten with a plus sign in front of φs. The signs of estimated
parameters β are reversed correspondingly.
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5 Results and discussion
Table 2 provides estimates (coefficients and average marginal effects) of the stereotype logistic regres-
sion. The average marginal effects indicate the average change in the probability that a firm engages in
imitation or innovation with a unit change in the independent variable for given values of other regres-
sors. Figure 1 plots the marginal effects at means of the categories of the number of competitors from
1 to 5 and from 6 to 15 and the effect of relative profit differences for a range of the patent protection
effectiveness values. Figure 2 plots marginal effects at means of the patent protection effectiveness for
each category of the number of competitors and for a range of relative profit differences.
The appropriability of the econometric specification is examined by the estimates of φk, which
indicate the distance between categories of the dependent variable. We see that the parameters φk
are monotonically increasing with respect to j, which means that the model is appropriate for the
ordered dependent variable and the categories of the dependent variable are ordered in accordance
with the impact of the independent variables on them. To see how the effect of market characteristics
on firm’ innovation strategy choice varies among adjacent categories, we compare φ̂3 − φ̂2 = 0.791
(innovation-imitation) and φ̂2− φ̂1 = 1 (imitation-no innovation). This suggests that firm and market
characteristics have a stronger impact on the odds of a firm’s choice between imitation and no inno-
vation than on the odds of the choice between innovation and imitation. Furthermore, Wald and LR
tests are performed to check the distinguishability of the dependent variable categories (the equality of
φk). Because the hypothesis that all parameters φk are equal can be rejected at 0.01 significance level,
we conclude that the categories of the dependent variable are distinguishable. The overall predictive
ability of the model is similar to that of full multinomial logit model and is over 58%.
Regarding internal firms’ characteristics, firm size is found to have a positive but decreasing effect
on the degree of firms’ innovativeness. The quality of human capital and the intensity of capital
expenditures also have a significant positive impact. Geographical market size has a significant positive
effect for firms that have access to the European and worldwide markets. The location of a firm in
former Eastern Germany after controlling for other factors, turns to be insignificant.
Remarkably, the estimation results suggest crucial importance of external (market) factors for a
firm’s innovation strategy choice. The success of legal IP protection mechanisms, especially patents,
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positively affects firms’ choices to engage in imitative or innovative activity. This fact can have several
explanations. First, the reduction of uncertainty about R&D outcomes and future profits due to patent
protection plays an important role in the firms’ decision to engage in imitation, or incremental innova-
tion, as well as in radical innovation. Second, the positive effect on imitation can be indirect, through
the increased incentives of innovators to license their technologies. Therefore, this result might provide
support for the arguments of Arora and Gambardella (1994), Gans and Stern (2003), and Gans et al.
(2008). Notably, this overall positive effect is significantly higher for the IT and Telecommunication
servies. Finally, no significant effect of IP protection by trademarks is found. However, in industries
such as glass and ceramics manufacturing, automobile retail services and transport the IP protection
effectiveness by trademarks is significantly positively associated to firms’ innovativeness. Surprisingly,
there is a negative association between innovativeness and protection effectiveness by trademarks in
sectors related to IT and Telecommunication services. Overall, the sectors that belong to IT and
Telecommunication services indicate a high importance of patent protection effectiveness whereas the
impact of trademark effectiveness is found to be lower than in any other industries.
Competitive pressure is measured by the number of main competitors and relative profit differences.
The results show that the oligopolistic market structure with 1-5 main competitors is the one that
favours most imitation and innovation. The category of having 6-15 main competitors also shows a
slightly lower positive effect. Finally, the impact of having more than 15 competitors is lower and in
some specifications even insignificant. This suggests a weak evidence for an ”U-inverted” relationship
between the number of competitors and firms’ incentives to innovate and imitate. As compared to
the firms that have no competitors, firms with a small or medium number of competitors are more
propense to imitation and innovation. When the number of competitors grows higher, this positive
effect vanishes. According to another indicator of competitive pressure, a lower level of competition
measured by relative profit differences in the industries is related to a decrease in firms’ propensity
to imitate and innovate. This effect weakly decreases for imitation and becomes insignificant for
innovation when IP protection effectiveness perceived by firms increases.
The marginal effects of the number of competitors calculated for a range of values of patent protec-
tion effectiveness are ploted on Figure 1. The results suggest that for low levels of patent protection
effectiveness a small (from 1 to 5) or medium number of competitors (from 6 to 15) is positively
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related to firms’ incentives for imitation and innovation. However, for high levels of patent protection
effectiveness the effect of a small or medium number of competitors is even higher for the incentives
to innovate whereas and lower for the incentives to imitate. This means that with a high effectiveness
of intellectual property protection (or high appropriability of knowledge) more firms turn to introduc-
tion of market novelties rather than adopt products already existing in the market. Regarding relative
profit differences, Figure 1 shows that the negative effect of lower competitive pressure diminishes for
imitation and becomes insignificant for innovation when the perceived effectiveness of patent protec-
tion is high. This suggests that the innovation-enhancing effect of higher competition measured by
relative profit differences in an industry diminishes for imitation and looses relevance for innovation
with higher perceived IP protection effectiveness.
The positive effect of the perceived effectiveness of patent protection also varies with the level
of competition. Figure 2 shows that for imitation this effect increases with increase in the number
of competitors, although only for the categories 0 and 1. For the categories 2 and 3 this effect
turns to be insignificant. For innovation, the positive effect of the perceived effectiveness of patent
protection increases with the number of competitors with the maximum for 6 - 15 competitors, and
then decreases. Therefore, we can observe a weak U-inverted shape between the number of competitors
and the innovation-enhancing effect of the perceived effectiveness of patent protection.
The results of this article extend the previous findings on the firms’ choice between innovation
and imitation. First, this study uses a larger sample of firms from manufacturing and services sectors
than the predecessors (Link and Neufeld, 1986; Vinding, 2006). Second, the results of previous
studies are contradictory. Specifically, the former finds that market power is crucial for firms to
engage into innovation and imitation. Conversely, the latter finds that an increase in competitive
pressure enhances introduction of improved products and market novelties. The present study uses
two measures of competitive pressure and suggests a non-monotonic effect of competitive pressure on
firms’ incentives to imitate and innovate for the number of competitors and a monotonic effect for
relative profit differences. A small or medium number of competitors is found to have the highest
positive impact on innovative performance of an industry in terms of new product introduction. In
addition, the present results emphasize that the effect of competitive pressure might vary depending
on the effectiveness of IP protection preceived by firms.
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The present results are also related to several theoretical studies. They provide support to Boldrin
and Levine (2008) who argue that IP protection is a good mechanism for enhancing innovation. The
present article goes further analyzing how this effect depends on the level of competition a firm faces.
Opposite to Vives (2008), empirical evidence for German firms suggests that an increase in market
size has a non-ambiguous positive effect on the introduction of new products. Finally, the results
contradict the theoretical results by Zhou (2009). Using a standard oligopoly framework he shows
that intensified competition measured by an increase in the number of competitors always dampens
innovation. Under an moderate level of competition, weak IP protection (or a high exogenously given
level of spillovers) increases firms’ incentives to innovate. This might result from the fact that in
Zhou (2009) the model does not account for possible changes in innovation strategies chosen by firms
(innovation and imitation) when it becomes more profitable to switch from the current strategy. When
the level of spillovers is high (or the level of IP protection is weak), the former innovators might find
it more profitable to switch to imitation, increasing competition among imitators. Contrary to Zhou
(2009), the present article finds that a small or medium number of competitors can stimulate both
product innovators and imitators. IP protection to a large extent affects a firms’ choice to innovate
and, indirectly, has a lower positive effect on product improvement by imitators through an increased
activity of innovators. Therefore, when looking at the effect of competitive pressure and intellectual
property protection, it is essential to model a firms’ innovation strategy choice as endogenous.
6 Concluding remarks
The present article explicitly considers that firms may have different innovation strategies (innovate,
imitate or abstain from innovation) and analyzes how IP protection and competitive pressure jointly
affect firms’ innovation strategy choice. The results show that the perceived effectiveness of patent
protection positively affects firms’ innovativeness, i.e. propensity to imitation and innovation. This
effect varies with the level of competitive pressure measured by the number of competitors. The
increase in the perceived effectiveness of patent protection enhances imitation only for a small number
of competitors, whereas for innovation it has a U-inverted shape with the maximum effect for firms
with 6 - 15 competitors. Similarly, the number of competitors and firm innovativeness are related in
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U-inverted shape with the highest positive effect of a small and a medium number of competitors.
However, this effect varies with the perceived patent protection effectiveness. If the perceived patent
protection effectiveness is low or medium, both innovation and imitation are enhanced, whereas if it is
high, only innovation is enhanced. The relative profit differences indicator suggests that a decrease in
competitive pressure negatively affects both imitation and innovation, and this effect becomes weaker
for imitation and stronger for innovation when IP protection effectiveness perceived by firms increases.
The findings of the article add to understanding the link between IP protection policy and competi-
tion policy. According to the Schumpeterian view, these two policies affect firms’ incentives to innovate
in opposite directions. Whereas the former policy gives monopoly rights to innovators, thus, increas-
ing incremental profits from innovation, the latter policy suppresses firms’ market power decreasing
incremental profits from innovation. My results suggest that IP protection policy and competition
policy can reinforce each other in promoting innovation. For instance, in markets with few competi-
tors better patent protection might positively affect firms’ incentives to introduce market novelties.
On the contrary, in markets where firms have almost monopoly power an increase in patent protec-
tion can promote an introduction of improved products, i.e. incremental innovation, rather than the
introduction of market novelties, i.e. radical innovation. Despite the common patent system for all
industries the perceived effectiveness of IP protection by firms can be affected, for instance, through
the courts’ interpretation of novelty and non-obviousness. Therefore, these findings can be relevant
for policy makers.
Once the factors that affect firm innovation strategy choice are identified, another question arises.
Is it efficient to have much imitation in the markets or is it better to restrict imitation providing
monopoly power to innovators? This question is addressed in recent theoretical studies. For instance,
Ko¨nig et al. (2012) introduce the endogenous choice between innovation and imitation into an en-
dogenous model of technological change, productivity growth and technology spillovers. Fostering
only innovation increases the inequality in the industry, which lowers overall economic performance.
Increased imitation in the absence of innovation doesn’t contribute to productivity growth. Therefore,
they suggest to enhance both in-house innovation and technology diffusion through imitation. How-
ever, further theoretical research is needed to analyze social welfare implications of the innovation /
imitation balance under different market structures with endogenous innovation strategy choice.
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Several limitations of the present study call for further research on this topic. First, due to
data structure this study adopts a static perspective. An analysis with panel data would allow to
account for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and would decrease the potentially existing bias
due to omitted variables. Second, the analysis of sectorial patterns of innovation strategy choice is
obstructed due to the small number of observations. Although implementation of sector-specific R&D
policies is a difficult task, it would be especially valuable for industrial policy design. Third, firms’
innovation strategies should be analyzed in more dimensions than exclusively the dimension adopted
in this article. Future research should explore the other dimensions such as the internal or external
sources usage for incremental and radical innovation. Finally, conditional on the innovation strategy
chosen it is important to evaluate quantitatively the innovative effort of firms.
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Variable Mean Std.dev. Med Min Max
Innovation strategy 0.441 0.725 0 0 2
Log N empl. 3.846 1.564 3.761 0 12.143
Human capital 19.904 23.713 10 0 100
Capital intensity 0.057 0.109 0.022 0 0.868
Export intensity 0.139 0.231 0.002 0 1
Belongs to a group of firms 0.305 0.461 0 0 1
East.Germany 0.338 0.473 0 0 1
Av. succ. pat. prot. 0.530 0.551 0.289 0 3
Av. succ. tradem. prot. 0.442 0.343 0.393 0 3
Rel. profit diff. 0.489 0.334 0.510 0 1
Variable Categories
0 1 2 3
Number of competitors 9.24% 22.63% 42.83% 25.29%
Geographical market size 28.60% 29.45% 16.96% 24.98%
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1253 observations).
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Model 1 Av. marg. effects (Base model)
Coefficient (Std. Err.) No-Innovation Imitation Innovation
Firm characteristics
Log N empl. 0.258*** (0.061) -0.053*** 0.018*** 0.035***
% Empl. with high ed. 0.015*** (0.003) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002***
Capital intens. 0.676*** (0.258) -0.139*** 0.047** 0.091***
Export intens. 0.345 (0.286) -0.071 0.024 0.046
Group (0/1) 0.096 (0.152) -0.020 0.007 0.013
German market (0/1) 0.269 (0.200) -0.052 0.021 0.031
European market (0/1) 0.524** (0.207) -0.108*** 0.041** 0.067***
Worldwide market (0/1) 0.534** (0.249) -0.110** 0.041** 0.069**
Eastern Germany (0/1) 0.015 (0.108) -0.003 0.001 0.002
Market characteristics
Eff.patent prot. 0.372* (0.191) -0.076** 0.026* 0.050**
Eff.patent prot. Food/Tobacco -10.760* (6.407) 2.205* -0.754* -1.451
Eff.patent prot. Sector IT/Telecom 5.295** (2.614) -1.085** 0.371** 0.714*
Eff.trademark prot. 0.301 (0.274) -0.062 0.021 0.041
Eff.trademark prot. Glass/Ceramics 4.582*** (1.002) -0.939*** 0.321*** 0.618***
Eff.trademark prot. Electr. Equipment 1.854** (0.813) -0.380** 0.130** 0.250**
Eff.trademark prot. Retail/Automobile 5.181** (2.110) -1.062** 0.363** 0.699**
Eff.trademark prot. Transport 2.237** (1.056) -0.458** 0.157** 0.302**
Eff.trademark prot. IT/Telecom -4.392* (2.281) 0.900** -0.308* -0.592*
1 - 5 competitors 1.366*** (0.486) -0.280*** 0.096*** 0.184**
6 - 15 competitors 1.219** (0.503) -0.250** 0.085** 0.164**
more than 15 competitors 0.903* (0.482) -0.185* 0.063* 0.122*
Rel.profit differ. -0.374** (0.190) 0.077** -0.026** -0.050*
Industry dummies ( joint significance)
χ2 (25)
(φ1 = 0, φ2 = 1) φ3 1.791***





% pred. prob. 58%
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗ and ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% level.




str A firm’s innovation strategy by 2007: 0 = to abstain from innovation, 1 = to
imitate, 2 = to innovate.
Independent variables
Firm characteristics:
lsize A log-size of a firm in 2004, measured as a number of employees.
hc A firm’s human capital measured by the proportion of all employees who have
a university degree or other higher education qualification in 2004.
capint An intensity of capital expenditures in 2004, normalized by overall turnover
in 2004.
expint An intensity of export in 2004 measured by a turnover from export, normalized
by overall turnover of a firm.
group A dummy indicating if a firm belong to the group of firms: 0 = no; 1 = yes.
geo A geographical size of the market availabe for the firm: 0 = local or regional
market, 1=nation-wide market in Germany, 2 = European Union (EU), the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and EU candidates, 3 =
the worldwide market.
east A dummy indicating if a firm is located in the former Eastern Germany: 0 =
no, 1 = yes.
Market characteristics:
pat, tm The effectiveness of patents and trademarks as a legal protection mechanism
for innovations and inventions evaluated as 0 = not applicable, 1= poor, 2
= medium, 3 = high. For each firm this value is calculated as an average
effectiveness of patent and trademark protection in its NACE 3-digit industry
code excluding the firm in observation.
com The number of main competitors: 0 = no competitors, 1 = from 1 to 5 com-
petitors, 2 = from 6 to 15 competitors, 3 = more than 15 competitors.
rpd The relative profit difference between a firm and the most efficient and the
least efficient firms in its NACE 4-digit industry code.
Table 3: Description of variables.
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